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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper was to determine the 
effects that colonisation had firstly, on nationalist 
sentiments of independence in Africa, secondly, on 
efforts toward achieving continental unity and thirdly, 
on the formation of the Organization of African Unity 
which was ultimately founded on thje 25th of May, 1963 , 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
An examination was first made of the development of 
the concept of African Unity, from Pan-Africanist theory 
in the early 19th century, to nationalist organizations 
aggitating for independence and unity, finally culmina­
ting in the Summit of Heads of States in Addis Ababa.
A review was also made of the period from to 
1958-1963 when efforts towards achieving African unity 
were taken by important African countries and which was 
when deep divisions and discord emerged as the legacy of 
the colonial era. An analysis was then made of the 
nature and differences of the two major methods of 
colonial adminsitration; the Direct Method used by the 
French and the Indirect Method adopted by the British, 
and their resultant effects on the development of the 
indigenous political leadership.
There is no doubt that the dynamics that developed 
out of the relationships between the colonial power and 
the colony had lasting, influences on the political 
philosophy and outlook of Africa’s leadership. In 
French Africa, where citizens of the colonies were 
theroretically accepted as citizens of France, the 
emphasis was on achieving rights they felt were being 
denied to them as French citizens. In British Africa, 
there was never any question that the ultimate goal was 
for total independence from Britain, as they were never 
considered British subjects.
As a result of these fundemental differences, the 
states were split in their attitudes towards African 
Unity. The Anglophone countries espoused total unity, 
and in some cases a single central government for the 
continent” while the Francophone countries favored at 
best, a loose association of cooperation.
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COLONIALISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
The Effect of the Colonial Experience 
on African Attempts to Unite
INTRODUCTION
The study of political science, government and 
international relations, eventually leads to the 
question of whether actions in the international realm 
are enacted by systems of states, by states themselves 
or by the men who create these states. The debate as to 
which approach of analysis is correct has gone on for a 
long time and probably will continue on for even longer, 
because there are never any absolute truths, and even 
loose generalities are faced with numerous contradic­
tions .
Nevertheless, a choice must be made as to how one 
will examine such a question; whether at the community 
level, the state level or the individual level. In most 
cases it is a combination of two or three of the above 
in varying degrees. This is the case when one looks at 
the political history of Africa, particularly when it 
comes to African Unity.
Two prevailing factors appear to be the colonial 
background and the charismatic personalities of indivi­
dual leaders. The early history of independent post­
colonial Africa, has been dominated by names like 
Kenyatta of Kenya, Nkrumah of Ghana, Houphouet-Boigny of 
the Ivory Coast, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure
of Guinea or Nasser of Egypt. More often than not, 
these men were not only larger than their governments, 
they were their governments, making key decisions 
unilaterally and particularly in foreign policy, 
determining which way their nations went..
The link between the perspectives of the individual 
leaders of Africa, and their colonial background, is 
primary; if these men were the actors, carrying out 
policy, the colonial experience was the backdrop against 
which these men were formed. It was the most influential 
of factors affecting the environment into which they 
would come after independence, and within which they 
would act.
An examination into this relationship would appear
i
to be recovering well trodden ground, and thus at best 
be a reminder of certain theories, and at worst be 
redundant. However, when looking at the same rela­
tionship as an influential factor in the formation of 
nationalist sentiment within the international realm, it 
no longer seems quite as redundant.
The Concise Oxford dictionary defines nationalism 
as ’’patriotic feeling, or principles, or efforts; policy 
of national independence". This paper focuses on the 
latter half of that definition, i.e., the pursuit of 
policies of national independence. The significance of 
the relationship becomes quite important, when one
3.
considers the role of nationalism in world affairs.
Since the end of World War II, the organisation and 
arranging of the international community has been influ­
enced by two fundemental trends. Firstly, the 
consolidation of the nation state as the principle actor 
in international affairs, secondly, the efforts towards 
creating supranational organisations to create order and 
regulate the international community.
The fact that both these trends went on at the same 
time does not mean that*they were condusive to each 
other.. In fact the pursuit of one implies the compromi­
sing of the other. To some extent the peace and stabi­
lity of the world depends on which trend is dominant; 
that is the question of who will actually keep world 
order; the restraint of individual nations, or some 
higher organisations.
The focus of this paper then, is on the influence 
that colonial backgrounds had on the development of 
nationalism | in Africa. I'n particular, how it affected 
perceptions on, 1) Pan-African Unity, 2) Regional 
African Unity and 3) individual state independence, by 
looking at the Organisation of African Unity which was 
founded on May 25, 19 63 in Addis Ababa.
While I accept the fact that there were other 
equally important factors affecting the founding of this 
body, I will confine myself to the relationship between
the colonial backgrounds, and the nationalism espoused 
by the elite group of African leadership at the time.
I will be concentrating mainly on the actual found­
ing of the OAU rather than looking at its subsequent 
history which was to a large extent predetermined by the 
O AU’s Charter, and the perception of its scope and 
authority.
I will also be looking at the history prior to the 
conference concerning African Unity, as well as looking 
back at the colonial systems and their effect on the 
subsequent leadership of Africa.
The ideas of freedom and self-determination in 
Africa have long been associated with the idea of 
Pan-Africanism and African Unity. Not only do the two 
ideas seem condusive to each other, and supportive, they 
developed along side each other and thoughts of the 
pursuit of freedom and self-determination are actually 
all embraced within the theory of Pan-Africanism. All 
were geared towards helping achieve eventual indepen­
dence for Africa and equality for people of African 
descent with the rest of the world. Therefore, I 
propose to go through the history of both, together, 
because as will become evident, their history is very 
much intertwined.
CHAPTER ONE
Early Pan-Africanism
The seeds of Pan-Africanism and African unity,
first sprouted in the Caribbean and the United States.
A precise definition o f .Pan-Africanism does not and
probably will never exist because it is a search for
utopia at one extreme and for simple equality and
dignity on the other, involving many different goals.
Some major components and themes include the idea of:
"Africa as the homeland of Africans and 
persons of African origin, solidarity among 
people of African descent, belief in a 
distinct African personality, rehabilitation 
of Africa's past, pride in Africa's culture 
and the hope for a united glorious future 
for Africa"^
Actions and undertakings with these ideals in mind 
are recorded as far back as the early 19th century, and 
the attempt to resettle American Negroes in the U. S. 
colony of Sierra Leone. There were movements to abolish 
slavery with many groups and activities' aimed at trying 
to achieve equality. Without becoming too bogged down 
in detail, we can acknowledge the attempt to reorient 
people of African descent in the New World back to 
Africa not only physically but spiritually and mentally
6.
as well. This coincided with the attempt to re-evaluate 
the Negroes as a race and reject the negative stereo­
types attributed to them, the main one being the need 
for European rule to bring order and progress to Africa.
Aspects of nationalist actions also took place in 
Africa itself. National churches sprang up and split 
from the European churches, placing native chiefs at the 
head of these churches just as the English monarch was 
the head of the Church of England.
This occurred in the colonies of Nigeria, the 
Cameroun and Basutoland in the late 1880's and the early 
1890 1 s.2
All these activites were going on but had not been 
unified under an all embracing, overriding philosophy 
such as Pan Africanism. This however changed with the 
emergence of men who could articulate these various 
actions ,as all being aspects of the pursuit of a common 
goal, and who would encourage and inspire these actions 
to continue with this larger goal in mind.
Among these early Pan-African theorists were men 
like J. Africanus Horton, Rev. James Johnson and Edward 
Blyden. All were, apart from their successful careers 
as academicians, prolific and powerful writers who 
shaped the thinking of future black leaders. Horton's 
most famous work was entitled "West African Countries 
and Peoples, British and Native. With The Requirements
Necessary for Establishing that Self Government Recom­
mended by the Committee of the House of Commons, 1865,
3
and A Vindication of the African Race" , both he and 
fellow Sierra Leonian, Rev. Johnson advocated the. 
development of independent African states, and in 
Johnson's case, a separate African Church, in order to 
develop the latent talents and skills which'the Negro 
race possessed as abundantly as any other, and which 
they had a right and a duty to use. Alongside these two 
men stands Edward Blyden, from Nigeria, whose real 
contribution was his ability to express ideas which 
encompassed Pan-Africanist sentiment and inspired many. 
His tracts such as "Hope for Africa", "The Negro in 
Ancient History" as well as his addresses on "Study and 
Race" were brilliant rejections of 19th century racist 
views by revelling in the glories of ancient Africa and 
in Africa's place in the future as a united power, for 
the benefit of African people. Blyden called for 
African states, saying, "So long as we live simply by 
their sufferance, we must expect to be subject to their 
caprices". It was Blyden's opinion that a strong, 
united Africa would also benefit Africans of the dias­
pora by helping them become citizens of the nations 
thay they lived in by giving them a focal point of pride 
and belonging.4
There are of course other names that should be
mentioned. Benito Sylvain of Haiti being just one of 
them. However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to 
present an exhaustive account of Pan-Africanist history, 
it is rather to present a general and basic background 
of the evolution of Pan-Africanist Thought, so that 
later analysis will not take place in a vacuum.
These men that I have mentioned were important in 
that they1 represented a period when ideas were being 
developed, discussed, and circulated resulting in a 
synthesis which was Pan-Africanist. This synthesis 
developed in stages, where not only was the body of 
thought first unified and made coherent, but more 
importantly the thinkers and articulators, came together 
and discussed unified action. This was done through a 
series of Pan-African Conferences.
The Pan African Conferences: Phase I
The first of these conferences took place in 
Chicago in 1893. Among those present were representa­
tives from Egypt, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and of 
course, from the United States. Speeches were made 
Edward Blyden, Booker T. Washington and Rev. Johnson. 
There was also a conference in Georgia in 1895. In 
1897, Henry Sylvester Williams, a barrister from Trini-
5
dad, launched the African Association. The common 
themes running through all these activities was the
rejection of the negative attributes imposed upon the 
Negro race, as well as a call to both Africans and the 
European powers that it was time for Africa to develop 
and take her place in the world of civilised men as 
equals and equally importantly a call to closer contact 
between fellow Africans in order to achieve these
i 6goals.
The Second Pan-African Conference which took place 
in Westminister in 1900 crystallized the attempts to 
achieve these goals. There were representatives from 
the Caribbean,, from the United States, most importantly 
W. E. B. DuBois and from the colonies in Africa as well 
The outcome of the conference resulted in the adoption
of a Pan-African organisation which was to replace the
f
African Association. It was based on five principles:
1. To secure civil and political rights for Africans 
and their descendents throughout the world.
2. To encourage friendly relations between the Cauca­
sian and African races.
3. To encourage the African peoples everywhere in 
educational industrial and comercial enterprise.
4. To approach Governments and influence legislation 
over the black races, and
5. To ameliorate the condition of the oppressed Negros 
in Africa, America, the British Empire and other 
parts of the world.
A secretariat was set up in London with various 
branches around the world to coordinate activities and
10.
deal with local issues. Also the Associaiton was to 
meet every two years.^
The next meeting which was held in the United 
States saw a preview of the later pre-eminence of W. E. 
B. DuBois. in Pan-Africanist thought. In a paper he 
presented which was later adopted by the gathering, he 
stated that the problem of the twentieth century was the 
problem of the color line. Aside from the paper's 
rejection of racial slurs and stereotypes, the paper was 
important for its call for France and Britain to grant 
independence to their colonies, and for the United
g
States to end the oppression of her Negros.
While the conference was historically significant 
and important to the later Pan-African movement, the 
achievements of the Association were limited due to the 
lack of funds and it faded into obscurity after 1902.
Garveyism
The next major development in the Pan-Africanist 
concept of African Unity and self-determination was the 
emergence of Marcus Garvey.
Born in Jamaica in 1887, he had a long and varied 
education, and an equally interesting career which began 
as a printer, before developing into an editor. Marcus 
Garvey would later mobilize large numbers of the Negro 
people in the United States, and temporarily place him-
self at the head of the movement to liberate the Negro, 
people from their physical, mental and spiritual 
oppression.
Much of Garvey's fame came from the flamboyant and 
spectacular manner in which he went about rehabilitia- 
ting the image of Africa and of ■ the black race.
In 1916, Garvey came to Harlem to try and 
capitalise on the noble sounding principles and 
doctrines which were echoing 'around the United States, 
particularly Woodrow Wilson's Four Points which called 
for democracy and self-determination in a world where 
pedce and cooperation were to be striven for. Garvey's 
fiery personality and ability to communicate and inspire 
crowds, combined with the right atmosphere led to the 
founding of the Universal Negro Imporvement Associaion 
in New York, which led to the publication of the NEGRO 
WORLD a newspaper which lasted until 1953.
Garvey's messianic vision of a future African 
Empire spawned a wave of businesses, groups and 
publications all supporting his call for Africans to do 
for themselves; he himself launched the Black Star 
Shipping line, calling for Africans to ship goods for 
African people. While Garvey's actions were limited to 
the United States, the knowledge of his action and his 
name spread all over Africa, and his calls of "Back to 
Africa" and "Africa for Africans" were to become
12 .
rallying cries for the Pan-Africanists and for the
9
nationalist movements as well.
Garvey's success soon faltered, primarily due to 
lack of organisation, and also because of Garvey's 
clashes with other Negro leaders, who ridiculed his 
excessive pomp, pagentry and other eccentricities. 
Garvey's success was not so much in his intellectuali- 
zation, or in his contribution to Pan-Africanist 
thought, but rather in his ability to gather and 
generate support among the masses of black people who 
were unmoved by reading brilliant speeches and papers. 
Garvey was first to demostrate the possibility of taking 
positive action, with the as yet unmobilised black 
people. His fall from grace came rapidly. After 
investigations about mismanagement of funds for the 
Black Star Line, Garvey was deported back to Jamaica, 
and never regained the influence or potential for 
influence that he once had. His fall however, cannot 
overshadow his contribution to the creation of a feeling 
of solidarity among Africans and people of African 
descent.
At the same time, several orgnizations sprang up in 
his wake, capitalizing on the new burst of enthusiasm he 
had generated: the Union of Students of African Descent 
and the African Progress Union, both based in London, 
were two examples.^
The Pan African Congress: Phase II
Developing alongside Garveyism during the same 
period was the work of W. -E . B. DuBois. DuBois was a 
leading spokesman and civil activist, as well as a 
brilliant scholar. His later career was devoted more to 
the international struggle for equal rights for people 
of African descent, leading to his becoming a 
pre-eminent Pan-African theorist.
DuBois convened a series of Pan-African meetings 
between 1919-1927, calling for progress for peoples of 
African descent and an end to discrimination and oppres­
sion not only in the United States but in colonial 
Africa as well. His London Pan-African conference of 
19 21 was more radical in tone than any of the previous 
Pan-African gatherings. The manifesto that was adopted 
by the conference criticised the colonial systems and 
the conditions of relations between the white and 
coloured races. It also pleaded for the respect of the 
sovreignity of Haiti, Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) and 
Liberia. The manifesto also challenged the rest of the
world to participate in the building of a great new
11society where all would be equals.
There were of course other forces working towards 
the Pan-African ideals. In August of 1925 the West 
African Students Union was launched in London. In 
brief, its principles were "to establish a hostel for
14.
the growing number of African students studying abroad,
to foster the spirit of national consciousness and
racial pride among all African people, to serve as a
center for information on African history customs and
institutions, to act as a center for research on all
12subjects pertaining to Africa and its development."
The significance of this organisation was that it 
provided a recognized and accepted forum for discussion. 
It also became a meeting point for the ever increasing 
number of African activists. Its monthly publication, 
WASU was influential in helping spread ideas of nationa­
lism and African Unity. The influence it would have 
later was reflected by its membership: Kwame Nkrumah of 
the Gold Coast, Jomo Keynatta of Kenya and Nnamdi 
Azikiwe of Nigeria, all of whom were to become major 
players in the drama of nationalism and independence.
To review at this point what it is we have been 
dealing with is to give a sense of all the different 
organisations and personalities involved in the quest 
for the rehabilitation of the Negro race, both in and 
out of Africa. Rehabilitation, in terms of creating 
pride in ones colour, ones race and the source of that 
race, Africa. There were therefore many aspects of this 
movement, all with the hope that eventually Africa and 
her people would be treated as equal participants in
world affairs and as equals based on the potential of 
her people.
The question of independence and self-rule was 
inevitable and in the quest for a bright future for 
Africa, the need for solidarity amongst all people of 
African descent, developed into solidarity between 
future African states as we'll.
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the start of 
World War II were the final ingredients in the 
blossoming of the movements for independence and 
indirectly, African Unity. The ideals for which the 
World war was being fought included among many others, 
the right to freedom for all peoples. The obvious 
contradictions between what the allies were saying and 
what they were practicing, became more difficult to 
ignore. Especially in view of the fact that many 
African soldiers actually took part in the conflict, and 
realised that they too were making the same sacrifices 
as the the European troops. Even more basically, both 
crises' created focal points around which and against 
which the numerous African activists could unite.
The invasion of Abyssinia in October of 1935 
resulted in countless committees and organisations to 
protest and force the League of Nations to take some 
action. As Abyssinia was one of the few black soverign 
states, the emotional response was intense.^
The declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 was 
another milestone in creating an atmosphere of national­
ism. The statement that "all people had a right to 
choose the form of government under which they would 
live and determine their political destiny" was 
reinforced by Clement Attlee, then Churchill's deputy, 
who in response to a WASU demand for clarification, 
replied that the Charter was applicable to all and would 
be denied to no one. The fact the Churchill subsequently 
categorised the statement as applying only to Europe 
only fanned the flames and the determination of the 
voices calling for African independence.
In 1943, George Padmore, a leading Pan-African 
writer from the West Indies and Nancy Cunnard wrote an 
article entitled "The White Man's Duty: An Analysis of 
the Colonial Question in Light of the Atlantic Charter". 
The article illustrates the growing frustration and 
gathering radical desire for freedom. The article's 
proposed Charter for the Colonies; called for economic, 
social and political equality in Africa, particularly in 
South Africa, whose systematic oppression was the 
greatest source of anger. For the British West Indies, 
internal self-government was to be granted immediately.
It would only be a matter of time before the same demand 
was issued for A f r ica.^
This did happen, in Manchester in 1945, at the
second official Pan-African Conference.
Pan-African Congress: Phase III
Prior to this in 1944, the Pan-African Federation 
was launched, in Manchester, which was to incorporate 
many of the existing Pan-African organisations, and 
while each of them was to remain autonomous, each was 
required to adhere to the basic framework of the P.A.F., 
which meant each was to promote unity and cooperation 
among people working towards the freedom and indepen­
dence of Africa. It was the P.A.F. whose voice led the 
ever increasing pressure on the Attlee government to 
live up to its promises on the colonial issue and it was 
the P.A.F. which undertook the organising for the
Manchester Conference inviting the aging W. E. B. DuBois
15to be the Chairman.
The Manchester Conference was probably the most 
effective and influential in the development of Pan- 
Africanism. It also marked a branch point. In the 
former meetings, never before had all of Africa and the 
Caribbean been represented. There were student 
organisations as well as Trade Union representatives, 
and other officially accredited delegates representing 
nationalist movements in the colonies.
As with WASU, there were individuals brought into 
contact with each other who were to become important to
history themselves. The effect of having official dele­
gates instead of having people attend in a private 
capacity meant that decisions and proposals now had 
effects beyond those who were present.
At the end of the conference the changing tone on 
self rule and independence was obvious: immediate
independence for British and French West African 
colonies, the British Sudan, and French North African 
colonies, was demanded. Economic, social and political 
reform were urged for East and Central Africa, the West 
Indies and British Guyana.
Solidarity was declared with Egypt's demands that
British forces be removed from her soil as well as with
the struggle against oppression in South Africa and the
16United States. As if that was not enough, the 
declaration went on to call upon the workers and farmers 
of the colonies to unite and organise to fight imperial­
ism, the use of strikes and boycotts was encouraged, 
following the example of India in her quest for indepen­
dence. There was a new militancy in the movement, a 
radical step forward not only in method but also in 
scope, and application.
The Pan-African idea was developing into a strong 
substantive movement for nationalism, with mass support 
back in the colonies geared towards achieving indepen­
dence. The self-determination aspect of Pan-Africanism
began to become paramount and receive more attention, 
the goal of solidarity followed close behind. Later it 
would lag farther and farther behind.
The period following the conference, can be 
described as one in which attempts were made to try and 
organise and control the growing swell of nationalist 
sentiment. The application of these militant strategies, 
including participating in strikes and boycotts led to 
increasing contact and cooperation between the Pan- 
Africanists in London and the nationlist movements in 
the various colonies.
There were numerous publications, articles and 
books geared towards this end, presenting ideas and 
opinions to the increasingly interested populations, and 
it was through these publications that reputations were 
made. Those who achieved such renown as thinkers, 
organisers and effective communicators found themselves 
being invited to return to their respective colonies and 
take a direct hand in the struggle for independence. In 
August of 1947, for example, Kwame Nkrumah left for the 
Gold Coast to become the secretary for the United Gold 
Coast Convention, the leading nationlist movement in 
that colony.^
The increasing predominance of the issue of nation­
alism and independence was facilitated by events in 
Africa itself.
In 1952, a military coup replaced the puppet 
monarchy of King Farouk with the nationalist Gamel 
Nasser at its head, supported by the Egyptian army.
That same year saw the outbreak of the "Mau Mau" upris­
ings in Kenya, long thought safely and firmly secured in 
the British Empire. Two years later the Algerian 
revolution began. There was a growing atmosphere of' 
tension and .expectation.
In 1955 the Bandung Conference was held in Cairo, 
which re-affirmed Asian solidarity with Africa's quest
for freedom, sending out another ripple into the already
18troubled waters.
Pan African Congress:♦ Phase IV
The last phase in the emergence of African Unity 
and the attainment of the goals of African nationalism 
was ushered in by the 1958 Conference of Independent 
African States, which was held in the newly independent 
nation of Ghana. Nkrumah1s previous participation with 
the Pan-African organisations in London had made a deep 
and lasting impression on him, and led to his unflagging 
pursuit of African Unity. On the eve of independence, 
he told the world press that "Ghana's independence is 
meaningless unless it is linked with the total libera­
tion of the continent of Africa."
Nkrumah was now in the uniquely powerful position
21.
of being one of the leading theorists of Pan-African
thought, and the Head of State of a nation. His close
links with with DuBois and Padmore led to his inviting
them to continue their work in Ghana, thus making it the
new center for the quest for African Unity and occasion-
19ally even for African nationalism.
Though the conference was attended by only eight 
nations; Egypt, Tunisia, Morrocco, Libya, Sudan, Liberia, 
Ethiopia and Ghana, the impact of the conference was 
inspirational to nationalist movements all over Africa. 
The conference was also significant because it raised 
the first hints of the tension between the drive for 
African Unity and the drive to consolidate independent 
nations.
Among the many resolutions and proposals called 
for, the delegates resolved to preserve unity of purpose 
and action in foreign policy. They stressed the need to 
avoid taking any individual action that might endanger 
their freedom of interest, while acknowledging the need 
for better communications and trade between African 
states and the need to invest their resources in achiev­
ing this. They agreed to do this so far as it did not
compromise the independence, sovreignty and territorial
20integrity of the states.
The African nationlist had switched roles, from 
being leaders of movements opposing the administration
22.
to actually being the administration. Their responsibi­
lities changed from trying to undermine and change the 
existing structure and system of government, to now 
trying to create and preserve a new order. Whereas 
before, they could suggest radical ideas and solutions 
as one set of intellectuals to another, they now had too 
much to lose and with independence achieved, little to 
gain.
Unity was a tool to be utilized towards the freedom 
of the whole continent. Beyond that it was to be a step 
towards asserting African influence on international 
affairs. Of course there were other reasons for solid­
arity and in these, African unity does not differ from 
other supranational organisations such as the United
t
Nations or the Organisation of American States or even 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. All 
of these bodies in one way or another, attempt to foster 
peace> economic development and cooperation. The area 
where the concept of African Unity goes farther is that 
its theory holds the ideal of a new political structure. 
In place of a group of separate sovereign states, a 
central Union government was to oversee a federation 
comparable to the United States. This also was not 
unique and has its parallel in the European Common 
Market, and the talk of a EuroGovernment.
The years following the 1958 conference saw the
majority of the African colonies achieve independence. 
Most of the new nations participated in the Pan-African 
meetings and organisations, there were differences in 
the interpretation, fervour and pursuit of a united 
Africa. This, combined with the internal differences 
between the different nations led to groupings and blocs 
based on regionalism and common colonial heritage, the 
French speaking nations coming together in their organi­
sations and the English speaking organisations in theirs, 
with the odd country in each group.
Between 1960 and 1963 the numerous different blocs
and groupings could all be said to represent the basic
split in ideology between the militant radical Casablanca
group, comprising Ghana, Egypt, Morrocco, Guinea, the
Algerian freedom movement (GPRA), Libya and Mali, and
the more conservative governments of French speaking
Africa, as well as Ethiopia, Libera, Libya (which
vacillated a lot) Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo
and Tunisia, called the Monrovia group, both taking
21their name from respective conferences.
The differences in ideology between the two major 
blocs represented the division that would plague the OAU 
in years to come and block any pursuit of a real, and 
radical concept of African unity. There were other 
issues that would split Africa into different groupings 
and it would be an oversimplification to say that the
Casablanca group held the common view of African unity.
Their solidarity with each other was expressed in
their activism for gaining independence for the rest of
Africa, and a common stand against neo-colonialism.
Nevertheless it was from this group that the calls for
Union Government, for a United States of Africa and
central government came, particularly from Ghana.
From the opposing view came the idea of solidarity
between independent soveriegn states.' Leading this
72group were the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Togo."'
As the rifts between these' nations worsened, and 
conferences were held ignoring some “and for the purpose 
of condemning others, Emperor Haile Selassie finally 
called for a conference where all would have a chance to 
present their views in front of all the African nations, 
and an attempt to organise structures promoting African 
Unity would be attempted.
Pan African Congress: Phase V
The Addis Ababa Conference was held from May 2 3-2 5 
in 1963. An unprecedented thirty heads of states met 
and agreed to form the Organisation of African Unity 
which would be the primary and principal body organising 
the relations between African nations themselves and 
African relations with the rest of the world. Beyond 
this point, the theory of African Unity would go no
farther in practice.
The principles and charter of the OAU represent a 
compromising of the more radical ideas of African Unity 
in its Pan-African trappings, and perhaps it was 
necessary: all supranational bodies represent 
compromises of individual national desires, they must 
also compromise in their purposes themselves so as to 
retain their appeal to as many different interest groups 
as possible. With the Addis meeting in particular, 
there was incredible pressure to come out of the very 
closely observed summit with something to show. Certain 
issues were therefore politely and temporarily forgot­
ten, at the same time the most fervrent proponent of the 
radical union of African states, Nkrumah of Ghana, had 
by this time antagonised and angered too many other 
heads of states with his self-proclaimed leadership of 
African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. There was in 
effect no single loud voice appealing for a truly united 
Africa. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising 
that the more conservative ideas of consultation and 
functional co-operation finally won out. The newly 
acquired status of sovereign nationhood was too precious 
to be tampered with, and was to remain paramount. 
Regional groupings based on economic and cultural ties 
were allowed, but competeing regional blocs would not be 
tolerated. The nature of the OAU was decided, the
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question as to whether it was permanent, was now 
dependent on how much each individual nation would 
tolerate interference.
The OAU does not and can not represent the apex and 
conclusion of the Pan-African goal of African Unity.
Not only is there strife and discord in Africa between 
member states, there is a growing sense of despondancy 
and frustration with the ineffectiveness,of the body. 
This is not only limited to the cynicism that most have 
towards these supranational bodies, it is a questioning 
of the very purpose of the body. When it celebrated its 
twentieth anniversay in 1983, a cynical press stated 
that its greatest achievement was that it had survived 
at all, given the numerous crises that had forced 
several meetings to be cancelled, and had seen some 
countries refuse to attend.
With the demise of the original founders of the 
body as well as the old guard of men who participated in 
the Pan-African organisation in London, one,has to 
wonder whether this temporary phase of African unity is 
not the final permanent one. At the same time the 
continuing political and economic crises1 which the 
African nations have been in since independence has led 
to increasing pressures and tensions augmenting the 
already uneasy composition of populations within these 
states. There is therefore a rigid intolerance of
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movements desiring to break away from the formal state, 
as this represents not only a decrease in power, and 
authority for the government, but also fosters doubt for 
the whole nation as well. The problem arises when an 
outside opinion favours the rebellions and this has been 
a problem facing the OAU. By championing the right for 
all Africans to have the right to self-determination, 
the OAU sets itself up in favour of rebel movements, or 
officially unrecognised organisations, which claim, 
legitimately, in some cases that they should not be 
ruled by the government of the state that was put in 
place in by the colonial power. The problem of 
arbitrary boundaries rises up again to haunt Africa. 
Ironically a solution to the problem is possible by the 
idea of federating, and creating a central government 
for all which would not be questioned. The nationalist 
urge, to maintain the territorial integrity of the state 
however, stands in the way, and the O.A.U. has not found 
a way to deal with the problem.
CHAPTER TWO
The Harvest of Fragmentation
The period between 1958-1963, saw a great transfor­
mation on the African continent. The independence of 
Ghana, was but the first in a flood of former colonies 
to achieve independence. In most.of the colonies, 
former leaders of the various national movements with 
their parties invariably came to head the administration 
and the first native governments.
The efforts to consolidate the former colonies into 
solid nation-states was soon faced with the increasingly 
strident call for African Unity. After all, the theorie 
of liberation had emphatically stated that a united 
African effort involving all of Africa would be the most 
successful method of achieveing national liberation. At 
the same time, the very theory and essence of the liber­
ation struggle in Africa was integrated with solidarity 
and unity among blacks both in Africa and outside the 
continent. The difference now though, was that the 
leaders of the liberation struggle had now moved from a 
position where Pan-Africanist theory had been another 
weapon aimed at achieveing independence, (and where it 
was more rhetoric than action,) to the stage where the
theory waited to be interpreted, and put into practice. 
It was in this arena that the tensions arose; over the 
interpretation of African unity and African solidarity. 
Historical evidence documents the conflict over inter­
pretation, showing the .splits and eventual cleavages 
which so influenced the formation of the OAU and its 
charter. The history unfolds itself in the form of 
numerous conferences, movements and declarations.
The first of these conferences were the two held in 
Accra in 1958. The first, which consisted of the eight 
independent African nations at that time, Ghana, Egypt, 
Eithiopia, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco, 
and the second, also in 1958 which was attended by most 
of the political parties and organisations in Africa, 
and was unofficially known as the All African Peoples 
Congress.
The Conference of Independen-j: African States
Upon achieving independence for Ghana, Kwame 
Nkrumah, soon showed his committment to Pan Africanism. 
He first invited George Padmore to be his advisor on 
African affairs. Padmore, an eminent writer and 
theorist had been deeply involved in many of the 
orgnisations which had agitated for independence, and 
while in London, was one of the main organisers of the
Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945.
Accra soon became the center for propaganda and 
revolutionary material which spread to many parts of the 
continent. After consulting with the Heads of State of 
the independent nations, Nkrumah then convened a confer­
ence in Accra. While specific resolutions towards 
achieving a single African government, or a union of 
African states were not declared, there was a strong 
presentation of what was defined as ’an African person­
ality', which was described in the .following manner;
"We resolve to preserve the unity of purpose 
and action in the international affairs which 
we have forged amongst ourselves in this 
historic conference; to safeguard our hard 
won independence, sovreignity and territorial 
integrity; to preserve among ourselves a 
fundemental unity of outlook on foreign 
policy so that a distinct African Personality 
will play its part in co-operation with other
peace loving nations to further the cause of
„ 23 peace .
The conference also laid the groundwork for the All 
Africa Peoples Conference, which occured later that 
year. Out of this conference came a more militant 
rhetoric on the topic of the liberation of the rest of 
Africa, than had been the case with the preceding 
conference. Attendance at the conference bestowed great 
status on the various nationlist movements, throughout
Africa. The conference also raised the issue of inter­
preting exactly what African Unity would entail. 
Suggestions towards achieving a Union of African States 
were discussed, and regional groupings were suggested as 
a first phase. Among the resolutions declared were:
1. An endorsement of Pan-Africanism and the 
desire for unity among African people.
2. A declaration that the ultimate objective was 
the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free 
African States.
3. A call to the independent States of Africa to 
lead the peoples” of Africa toward the attain­
ment of this objective.
4. An expressed hope that the day would dawn when
the first loyalty of African States would be
24to an African Commonwealth.
The language and intent of the resolutions was 
diplomatically vague and general, yet, there can be 
little doubt that a single African body, even such a 
loose one as a commonwealth was present in the minds of 
the participants of the conference. The conference went 
further and encouraged regional groupings.
The gathering endorsed the desire in various parts 
of Africa for regional groupings of states, and 
advocated that such groupings be based on three 
principles namely:
1. Only independent states and countries governed 
by Africans should come together, and
2. The establishment of groups should not be 
prejudiced to the ultimate objective of a 
Pan-African Commonwealth.
The Conference also went on to denounce the artifi­
cial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers and recom­
mended their abolition or adjustment at an early date.
A permanent Secretariat was set up to promote under­
standing and unity and among other things a feeling of 
one community among the people of Africa, with the 
objective of facillitating the emergence of a United 
States of Africa.
It was from, this conference that the seeds of the 
Ghana, Guinea and later Mali, Union first germinated.
One cannot ignore the fact that even though Nkrumah of 
Ghana, as a radical Pan Africanist, would probably have 
come to the aid of Guinea, upon her abrupt attainment of 
independence, (which shall be dealt with later), it was 
the conference however that produced the theory and 
framework, which enabled the union to come into being on 
the 1st of May 1559, in Conakry Guinea.
The fact that the Union was made up of only two 
states did not undermine its significance, or inhibit 
its goals and declarations. The union was seen, by its 
members as a nucleus of the eventual United States of 
Africa, and the bulk of its document reflected that
orientation.
Ghana and Guinea were already established radical
states vis a vis Pan Africanism, and this union and the
rhetoric that surrounded its founding only enhanced that
reputation. Yet at the Sanaquille Conference held in
Liberia that same year, the participants agreed to the
principles of non-interference in the domestic affiars
of others, and were also expected to maintain their
25individual structure. The Sanaquille declarations 
were just the first of many such documents, where 
conservative formality took preventative action against 
.the radical Pan-Africanist elements.
The second All African Peoples Conference, which 
was held in Tunis in January of 1960, also called for 
African Unity. Its objectives included the promotion of 
understanding and unity among African people; development, 
of a feeling of one community, accelerating the libera­
tion struggle, and mobilising support for the struggle
and finally working for the emergence of a united states
, _  . 26 of Africa.
In trying to express the 'African Personality' the 
conference warned against neo-colonisation and balkani- 
sation which were to be fought through economic coopera­
tion among African states. To this end an effort was 
made to start an African Trade Union.
34.
While there was unanimity on most of the resolution 
at the conference, the Trade Union issue caused the 
first crack in the facade of unity and concensus. The 
origins of the split came back down to the differences 
between the radical and conservative African Nationa­
lists. The radicals wanted the new All Africa Trade 
Union Federation, to be unafiliatedd with any other, non 
African Union including thie Communist International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) and the 
Western oriented World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU). Their insistence on this position was one which 
had appeared earlier at an informal African Trade Union 
meeting held in Accra, which had also been geared 
towards starting an All African Trade Union. At the 
same time that this conference was being held, Kenyan 
nationalist and cofounder of KANU, the Kenyan
t
Nationalist Party, Tom Mboya, called for a meeting of 
the ICTFU in Lagos. This action was not well received 
by the radical Ghanaian press, which accused the Lagos 
conference of being imperialist, and detrimental to the 
establishment of an African Personality. The clash was 
so severe that a decision could not be agreed upon in 
Tunis and it was decided to discuss the subject again at 
the conference of All African Trade unions to be held in 
Casablanca later than year.
In 1960, the proponents of continued links with the
ICTFU formed the African Regional Organisation of the 
ICTFU. When the African Trade Union Federation was set 
up in May of 1961 in Casablanca, members were given ten 
months within which to disaffiliate themselves from the 
ICTFU, yet at the founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 
1963, nothing was agreed upon or put into writing about 
the Trade Union issue.
The Trade Union issue was just one of many points 
of conflict on which the leadership of Africa would come 
to decisions on, and decide where they stood vis a vis 
interpreting the meaning of African Unity. The other 
critical event which finally laid down the lines of 
demarcation, was the. Congo incident which erupted in 
1960 .
The Congo Crisis - Historical Background
The roots of the Congo crisis lay primarily in the 
colonial legacy left behind by eighty years of Belgian 
rule. The manner in which the Congo was administered 
was more authoritarian and dictatorial than either the 
English or French systems.
From 1885 to 1908, the Congo was administered as 
the personal property of King Leopold of Belgium. The 
Belgian cabinet and parliament therefore had nothing to 
do with it. During this period, the major tribal powers 
were destroyed or scattered. World criticism at the
harshness of Leopold's rule soon forced the Belgian 
government to take over.
While the excesses of Leopold were stopped, the 
Belgians, anxious to keep the various tribes weak, 
increased the number of chiefs by an incredible amount. 
Between 1914 and 1919, the number grew from 3,653 to 
6,095. The administration ignored traditional rights of 
succession and appointed whomever they wished. The 
result not only undermined traditional authority, but 
also laid the ground work for the fractured, 
rival-ridden frame work from which the Congo was to be 
built when it attained independence.
Compounding this shaky structure was the fact that 
Belgium devoted negligible time and resources to 
development in the Congo. Education and Health services 
and infrastructure were distant seconds in priority 
while mining profits for companies like Societies 
Generale, were first and formost in the minds of the 
Colonial administration. Consequently, the local 
colonial administration made no effort to recruit the 
indigenous population for positions of responsibility, 
where administrative skills could be developed.
As late as 1955, an unofficial but much publicized
report, suggested that Congolese independence could be
fixed for 1985, and even that was considered a bit 
27daring. The development of nationalist movements
was obviously hampered; natives were barred from going
abroad for education, except in a few non-Catholic
cases. The late 1940!s saw the introduction of a system
of civic merit cards, that every Congolese over the age
of 21 could show that he truly aspired to the higher
civilisation, that of assimilation to Belgian culture
2 8and colonial values. The Congolese were finally
granted the right to form political parties in 1959.
Prior to this, groups which were allowed were “comprised
mostly of old boys associations, and non-political
clubs. Where there were political organisations, they
29were basically formed along tribal lines. “It was 
with this background that the Congo stumbled into 
independence.
The sudden shift in Belgian policy, regarding 
Congolese independence is still open to speculation, but 
there are two theories that stand out. One holds that 
the riots in Leopoldville which led to the police and 
the Force Publique killing forty-nine and wounding 
others, broke the genteel insulation which had muffled 
earlier Congolese protest, and caused disapproval at 
home in Belgium. The other, contends that Brussels 
thought that a rapid tranfer of power to inexperienced 
men and conflicting interests would be the best way of 
prolonging the colonial system by forcing the Congolese 
to request the return of the Belgians. Consistent with
this argument is the action taken by the Belgians; 
immediate independence was offered. It took one year 
for the different political parties to agree upon a date 
for independence. However when it was agreed upon, the 
Belgians went one better, and pushed the date ahead by 
one year, and granted the Congo independence in June of 
1960. The crisis started almost immediately.
The key factions acting out the drama were the 
Mouvement National led by Patrice Lumumba, who was 
appointed Prime Minister and the ABAKA movement led by 
Joseph Kasavubu, who was appointed President (and who 
only reconciled with Lumuumba at the All African Confer­
ence in Accra in 19 58) . Under them was an administra­
tion of 9,801 Belgians, most of whom left immediately 
for Katanga province. Of the remaining 11,803 Africans, 
11,000 were barely literate clerks in grade 5, 800 were
in grade 4 and of the rest, none had reached the first 
30grade. There was literally no one to run the 
government. Added to this was the seccession of the 
copper rich Katanga province, led by Moise Tshombe on 
July 1st and that of South Kasai, under Albert Kaondji 
on August 8th.
In desperation, Lumuumba and Kasavubu asked for 
United Nations peace keeping forces to try and regain 
some stability. The force was made up mostly of troops 
from the independent African nations, some of whom,
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Ghana, for example had already received direct calls for 
assistance from Lumuumba. Among those that sent troops 
were Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia and Ghana.
The Congo crisis soon had larger implications for 
the rest of Africa, other than just the collapse of a 
newly formed state, if that were not important enough. 
Increasing the stakes, were the visible and perceived 
interests of Western Europe. What with all the fiery 
rhetoric about new-colonialism coming from the more 
radical Pan-African states for the past few months, the 
fact that the numerous companies stood to benefit, by 
-maintaining the existing working relationship they had 
with Katanga made it an issue of critical importance 
towards projecting an African personality. The fact 
that Belgium supported the Katanga secession, and helped 
train Tshombe's new army, and that it had also set up 
two NATO bases in Katanga, were a challenge that protag­
onists of African unity or even African nationlism, 
could not afford to ignore or respond to.
Lumuumba called for a conference in August of 1960, 
hoping to be vindicated and have his cause championed. 
Attending states included*Eithiopia, Ghana, Libya, 
Morocco, Sudan, Togoland, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the UAR 
and the Algerian Provisional government. Here the signs 
of the clevage in African unity, which the Congo crises 
would aggravate, began to emerge.
Firstly, although Nigera had attended the Addis 
Ababa conference in 1960 as an independent state 
(although not yet independent) she v/as not invited to 
Leopoldville for precisely that reason. At the same 
time, no concrete resolutions were reached either in 
condeming the UN for its lack of decisive action, or 
stating full support for Lumuumba. Only Guinea 
supported Lumuumba's call for the for the military 
overthrow of Tshombe's rebel government. In short 
nothing was suggested and the confusion continued, 
causing more damage as the factions moved farther 
apart.  ^^
In December of 1960, a conference was held in 
Brazzaville, the capital of the French Congo. In 
attendance were the former members of French West Africa 
and Equatorial Africa. Like their Leopoldville counter­
parts, they came up with no suggestions other than that 
the Congo should become a loose federation. What did 
emerge from the conference was a moderate pro-French 
African bloc known as the Brazzaville group, which soon 
solidified and took its own position on Pan-African 
Affairs at later conferences.
As the situation in the Congo continued to 
fluctuate, the position of the other African states also 
began to become more confused. Lumuumba, having been 
let down by the lack of support from the Leopold
■conference, turned to the Soviet Union for aid, without 
consulting Kasavubu. The rift between them reopened, 
each dismissing' the other, therby causing yet another 
issue on which Africa would be divided. Kazavubu was 
known to be a federalist, and more acceptable to the 
West, while Lumuumba was a believer in a strong central 
governent, and an ardent Pan-Africanist. The radical 
Pan-African states though, were still reluctant to 
oppose the UN and world opinion by supporting him.
Efforts were made to force the UN to deal militarily 
with the rebels but these met without success. The 
situation was further complicated by the creation of a 
rival student-based government led by Colonel Mobutu, 
which promptly dismissed both Lumuumba and Kasavubu. 
Eventually Mobutu joined up with Kasavubu, leaving 
Lumuumba isolated. Prior to this the rest of Africa had 
already taken sides; the radical Casablanca bloc, Ghana, 
Guinea, Mali, Egypt and Morocco, the supported Lumuumba. 
After his death, they withdrew recognition of Kasavubu 
as Head of State, and gave moral support to Lumuumba's 
deputy, Antoine Gizenga. Supporting Kasavubu were 
Liberia, Tunisia and the Brazzaville group. Even 
amongst the different sides however, there were rifts; 
one of them being Ghana's failure to withdraw her troops 
from the UN forces in order to form a joint African High 
command. The actions taken by the hardline Casablanca
states alienated future independent states, who joined 
the Brazzaville group in May of 1961, forming the 
Monrovia group.
The Congo crisis provides an interesting case study 
within which to compare the characteristics *of the 
radical and conservative nation, as well as the so 
called middle readers.
The Casablanca group which supported Lumuumba 
believed in a strong central government,' and regarded 
federalism as a way of perpetuating factionalism,e which 
they saw as detrimental to African unity. They were 
suspicious of anything which seemed tainted with neo­
colonialism, and saw federalists as playing into -the 
hands of the imperialist cause. President Nasser's 
speech at the opening of the Third All African People's 
Conference in Cairo, in March of 1961, accused 
imperialist interests of using the UN to achieve their 
ends. He also went on to criticize African nations for 
the mistakes they had made and for nojt closing ranks and 
uniting as the colonialists had done.
Events in the Congo provided material around which 
the Casablanca group solidified into a block, just as 
had been the case for the Brazzaville group. This 
happened at the conference of Heads of States which was 
held in Casablanca in January of 1961. As this 
happened, the opposing view points from the other
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nations of Africa also coalesced. For example, the
Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafewa Balews, had
already dismissed the idea of a United States of Africa,
saying it would only create new problems: "Nigeria needs
many decades to achieve the level of other countries.
3 2Our most pressing problems are here, and only here."
This kind of sentiment was echoed by the Prime Minister
of Sierra Leone, Sir Milton Margai, who said that upon
attaining independence, Sierra Leone would not seek any
33close association with other African states* ,This
third viewpoint was championed by the so called Monrovia
Group, which stated its purpose and its aims as follows:
"To bridge the gulf that had existed in 
Africa between what werie called the 'Brazza­
ville Powers' and the 'Casablanca Powers'.
The conveners of the Monrovia Conference, 
very much disturbed by this artificial and 
unendurable division of Africa into blocs or 
groups set out to arrange a conference of 
all Heads of African states, including 
Malagasy, irrespective of their political
affiliations, The 'Casablanca Powers'
which had been invited to Monrovia then 
decided to decline the invitation 
intensified the rift between them and what 
came to be known as the 'Monrovian' group of
• 4- a- 34African states*
The resolution adopted at the conference was 
concrete evidence of their gradualist, more conservative
approach towards interstate relationships. First, there 
was to be absolute equality and sovreignity of African 
states. Second, each state had the right to exist and 
no state was to annex another. Third, voluntary union 
with another state was allowed. Fourth, non-interference 
in the affairs of sister states, including harbouring 
dissidents or initiating subversive action was to be 
allowed.
On two key issues, which the Casablanca powers 
pressed for, the recognition of the Algerian provisional 
government and the repeated nuclear tests being 
conducted by the French in the Sahara, nothing was said 
or done.
In contrast,, the Casablanca powers, adopted an 
African: Charter which called for a consultative 
assembly, with representatives from every African state, 
and which was to meet periodically. To facilitate this, 
political, economic and cultural committees were to be 
set up, as well as a joint High Command.
A final attempt at reconciliation was made at the 
Lagos conference in January of 1962. There were, after 
all, some points on which the two sides agreed. Like 
their Casablanca counter parts, the Monrovia group soon
called for cooperation in economic, scientific,
cultural, educational and technical fields, and
suggested that committees be set up to facilitate this.
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Still, the differences and the perception of these 
differences were too large to overcome. The Lagos 
conference again saw the Casablanca powers decline to 
attend, because firstly, they were not consulted in 
making arrangements for the conference, and therefore 
could not be properly prepared within the remaining 
time. Secondly, the failure to invite the Algerian 
Provisional Government, was too critical a point to be 
overlooked. The decision not to invite the Algerians, 
actually caused a rift between the states which attended 
the conference. Tunisia, Libya and the Sudan all 
declined to attend at the last minute, thus making the 
conference one composed mainly of states south of the. 
Sahara.
The Lagos conference formalized many o f  the 
decisions made by the Monrovia group. A general 
secretariat was to be set, up as well as a council of 
ministers, both geared towards working out areas of 
cooperation. The conference produced a charter which 
later became the charter for Inter- African and Malagasy 
States. The draft was sent to the various governments, 
and, the final charter was written three months later.
The Charter stressed sovreignty for all African 
States^ non—interference by African states in the 
internal affairs of another, and finally the non-accep­
tance of any supreme leadership.
The Lagos conference produced no different approa­
ches, or viewpoints on dealing with the rifts which were 
splitting Africa. The most significant achievement that 
it produced was that the seeds for the Addis Ababa 
conference of 1963 were first laid down and that can 
mainly be credited to Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia 
who assumed the role of mediator and whose remarks at 
Lagos contained an appeal for all the factions to come 
together.
"To escape exploitation, and to 
overcome the political.deficiencies which 
beset us, Ethiopia urges that while we press 
ahead with all urgency and speed in those 
economic areas in which rapid advance can be 
achieved, parallel steps would be simultan­
eously taken to explore the possibilities of 
achieving increased political unity among 
us. Ethiopia is committed to the principle 
of political, unity among African states, 
indeed, we believe that we all are, and that 
we differ only in our. assesment of the speed 
with which this most, desirable of goals can 
be attained. The task is now to devise the 
means whereby this basic agreement may be 
most rapidly advanced...The furtherance of 
politicaL unity this would be a fundemental
objective of the Organisation of African 
3 5States."
While the Emperor regretted the absence of the 
radical states, he warned "that no African can escape
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his solemn duty of work with' his fellow Africans for the 
cause of this great continent. And we pledge ourselves 
to labour unhesitatingly in the discharge of this 
obligation during the days ahead."
It was this kind of rhetoric with its apparently 
deep felt committment to Africa as a whole rather than 
any one viewpoint, that made the Emperor’s appeal and 
efforts at reconciliation successful. In the same 
speech, he continued:
"Ethiopia considers herself a member of
one group only - the African group ... We
contend accordingly that no wider and
unbridgeable gap exists between the various
groupings which have been created. It is
our? belief, to the contrary that a close and
careful analysis of the policies adopted by
the African nations today on a wider range
of questions emphasize, not the differences
among them but the large number of views
3 6which they share in common."
The most important element of the Emperor’s speech 
was of course the lack of support for the radical Pan 
African policies which were espoused by the Casablanca 
group., At the same time, by upholding increased politi­
cal unity as the eventual desired goal, he also avoided 
siding with the conservative Monrovia group. The 
emotional call that his speech sent out for 
participation at the Addis Ababa conference produced the
desired effect: both the Monrovia and Casablanca groups 
attended. However there was no direction the conference 
could take, and it did not take any, other than the road 
of compromise, and it was from this process that the
0.A.U.. was founded and its charter was written.
Addis Ababa May 196 3
The charter produced in Addis Ababa made solid the 
nature of compromise needed to secure the support of the 
Heads of State present at the summit. Among its 
purposes and principles were the following:
Article II
1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes:
a) To promote unity and solidarity of African 
states
b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation 
and efforts to achieve a better life for the 
peoples of Africa.
c) To defend their sovreignity, their territorial 
integrity and independence.
Article III
Principles
1. The sovreign equality of all member states?
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of.a 
member state?
3^ Respect for the sovreignity and territorial 
integrity of each member state, and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence.
There were admittedly other principles and goals 
declared but concerning African Unity, these were the 
main points agreed upon. The institution was to consist 
of an assembly of Heads of States, a council of Minis^ 
ters, a general Secretariat, and a Commission for 
Mediation, Concilliation and Arbritration. All these 
bodies were geared toward coordination and harmonizing 
political, diplomatic, economic cooperation as well as 
in transport.
The nature of the organisation was finalised right 
from the start and its scope and authority were clearly 
defined and limited. The conference was itself hailed 
as a success.. Both the Casablanca and Monrovia groups 
were disbanded and. in their place was a single all 
African body. The more strident demands for unity made 
by the radical Casablanca group for a single independent 
labour union, an African High Command, and even for a 
single central government were withdrawn, and still the 
Casblanca powers did join the OAU. The nature of their
compromise became obvious. It is a little harder to 
discern the nature of the compromises made by the 
Monrovia group. More significantly, a close review of 
the speeches made by the various Heads of State reveals 
little sign of flexibility and compromise.
Of the thirty-five speeches given, four of them, 
those given by the Heads of State, of Sudan, Liberia, 
Congo and Rwanda, do not deal with the issue of African 
unity at all and confine themselves to innocuous diplo­
matic congeniality. Added to this list of inapplicable 
speeches are the speeches of Haile Selassie, which must 
be put in a different category, and the rebuttal given 
by his Prime Minister to certain charges made by .the 
President of Somalia. The Emperor's speeches laid out 
the specific details of the OAU, and did not deal too 
much with long range Pan-African policy other than 
counselling compromise and patience.
"But through all that has been said or 
written and done in these years runs a 
common theme. Unity is the accepted goal.
We argue about technique and tactics. But 
when semantics are stripped away, there is 
little argument among us. We are determined 
to make a Union of Africans...It is our duty 
to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa, not 
to the nationalism of Europe's nineteenth 
century, not to regional consciousness, but
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to the vision of a single African 
brotherhood bending its united efforts 
toward the achievement of a greater nobler 
goal...
We should therefore not be concerned 
that complete union is not attained from one 
day to the next. The union we seek can only 
come gradually, as the day-to-day progress 
which we achieve carries us slowly but 
inexorably along this course. We have 
before us the examples of the U.S.A. and the 
USSR. We must remember how long these 
required to achieve their union. When a 
solid foundation is laid, if the mason is 
able and his materials good, a strong house 
can be built."
The Emperor's speech astutely trod the fine line by
endorsing eventual union, yet at the same time warning
against hastiness and calling for a gradual development
towards that union. The Emperor continued:
"Thus a period of transition is inevitable.
Old relations and arrangements for a time 
linger. Regional organisations may fulfill 
legitimate functions and needs which cannot 
otherwise be satisfied. But the difference 
is in this: that we recognise these circums­
tances for what they are, temporary 
expediants designed to serve only until we 
have established conditions which will bring 
total African unity within our reach."
The Emperor then went on to press for concrete
action in the form of the creation of the OAU, stating
that the conference could not be adjourned until a 
single African Charter was adopted and a single African 
organisation created. The stress then was on having 
tangible immediate reshlts to show progress, even at the 
expense’of the direction the body would take in the long 
term.
The other speeches also fell subject to the 
pressure of having to show results at the end of the 
summit, nevertheless, the viewpoints of the different 
heads of state did not change. Tunisia warned against 
rushing into immediate unity. President Leopold Senghor 
of Senegal elaborated in great detail, agencies which 
were to be set up in stages to increase cooperation 
between African states. He staunchly refused federation 
as did his collegues President Ahidjo of Cameroun, 
President Youlou of the Congo, and the heads of state of 
Malagasy, Niger, Dahomey, Chad, the Central African 
Republic, Somalia, Mauretania, the Ivory Coast, Mali, 
tapper Volta, Tanzania and Nigeria.
Of these speeches it is perhaps the speech of 
President Ahidjo of Cameroun which strikes the most- 
interesting note. On the topic of African unity, the 
President first warned the gathering to remember the 
diversity of the continent:
"But in actual fact how do we appear to 
the world? In spite of a strained will to 
unite, how different we really are! Differ­
ing cultures bequeathed by our former 
colonial rulers, each state differing in the 
way it obtained its freedom, differing in 
its economic structure, or in the institu­
tional organisation of our nations.
Differing also in the various friend­
ships we have made which could not help but 
influence our behaviour or our way of 
viewing things.
As is normally the case, we have 
different approaches to the fundemental 
problems of the hour, we have had an imper­
fect or incorrect vision of the internal 
situation of our neighbours. We have even 
had on occasion misunderstandings. We have
also been impatient or too eager to help,
3 7for right or wrong."
The relevance of President Ahidjo's speech becomes 
more apparent when one looks back again at the breakdown 
of where each state stood on the topic of African unity. 
Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Ethiopia, Tunisia, Senegal 
and the Congo, malagasy, Niger1, Dahomey, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Somalia, Mauretania, the Ivory 
Coast, Upper Volta and Mali all voted against any 
attempt beyond cooperation between sovereign nation 
states. Of these, all were French colonies, prior to 
independence, with the exception of Tanzania, and
Nigeria, which were British and Cameroun which was 
German.
Of the states which called for immediate Federation 
or anything more radical than simple cooperation were 
Egypt, Ghana and Uganda, all of which were formerly 
British, and Algeria and' Guinea which were French. Here 
too, interesting similarities are visible, because in 
both Algeria and Guinea, the road to independence from 
France was far from smooth and congenial. Algeria had 
had to wage a bloody eighteen year war, before the 
French were finally forced to grant independence.
Guinea, while not forced to wage a military struggle 
came to sudden independence without any aid or 
assistance from her former colonial master. When 
Charles de Gaulle offered France's colonies the choice 
of remaining a federation but with more autonomy, and 
the choice of being independent, only Guinea voted for 
compete independence. Within weeks, and even in less 
time in most cases, France pulled out of Guinea, going 
to the extent, some rumors have it, of pulling out 
telephones. In any case, Guinea was in dire straits, so 
much so that Ghana came to its aid, as has already been 
mentioned.
The colonial background of the African states can 
not be said to be soley responsible for the decisions 
made in Addis Ababa, because there were too many other
forces also at work. The reality was that despite the 
rhetoric of independence, most of Africa was still 
heavily dependent on their former colonial masters for 
assistance in almost all aspects of their economic and 
social development. One need only remember the example 
of Guinea and its bitter break with France. Still, 
among the myriad of factors affecting political outlook, 
the colonial heritage can not be ignored, because it is 
from this background, or rather against this backdrop, 
that the leadership of Africa was formed. It was 
against the colonial system that these leaders struggled 
and formed their -own personal convictions which later 
guided their decision making. It would therefore be 
amiss, were one not to look at the colonial heritage and 
its effect on the leadership of independent Africa.
CHAPTER THREE
Colonialism
European Involvement
European involvement and interest in Africa took a 
radical turn in the late 19th century. Whereas prior to 
1884 each power had had its trading interests and small 
spheres of influence scattered over Africa. The 
continent had not been divided up yet nor were these 
areas considered colonies i.e. with organised adminis­
trations and formal boundries. The 1884 Berlin Treaty 
changed all of that, and led to the infamous 'Scramble 
for Africa' which led to the division of these spheres
of influence into protectorates and eventually col- 
3 8onies. The importance of these boundaries lies in 
the fact that these are basically the same boundaries 
that the emerging African nations came into independence 
with. The problem with the boundaries was that they 
were arbitrary, created by the colonial powers for their 
own reasons, and that they defined the groupings within 
those boundaries, and thus made up the future citizens 
of these nations rather haphazardly. In most cases the 
boundaries split tribal groups between two colonial 
powers and in some cases placed some groups completely 
in one colony when their whole historical and cultural
orientation was i'n a neighbouring colony. In effect the 
only uniting factor in these colonies was the presence 
of the colonial power, and the eventual desire to be rid
of him, which began the movement for self-determina-
39tion.
While much was made of the 'white man's burden' or 
Europe's civilising mission, the driving influence 
behind these colonial conquests was the’economic and 
poltical competition between the colonising powers. As 
a result of this, individual colonial policy was never 
clearly established, nor did they have a clear direction 
beyond attaining the colony, maintaining control and 
exploiting its wealth. Thus, the administration of 
these colonies was haphazard in its development and 
often contradicting in its outlook and goals.
French Africa for example, at the height of its 
power in the 1950's included North Africa; Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Morrocco. In Black Africa it held French 
West Africa; Senegal, Sudan, Mauretania, Upper Volta, 
Niger, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, and French 
Equatorial Africa; Gabon, Middle Congo, Chad, and 
Oubangui-Chari Madagascar and later Cameroun. To the 
East there was French Somaliland, the Commoro Islands 
and Reunion. A look at the map shows the enormous 
distances over which these holdings lay, and emphasizes 
their lack of geographical and cultural similarity.
Completely ignorant of the difficulties that lay in the 
administration of such disparate holdings, France 
continued its campaign of acquiring new colonies.
The French are said to have followed the Direct 
System of ruling, with all power and decision making 
residing in Paris. All policy came in the form of 
Presidential decrees, prepared by the minister of 
Colonies and his staff.
After 1848, when France abolished slavery, all
Africans theoretically became French citizens, but this
became a reality only in the French West Indies and the
four coastal communes of Senegal where citizens were
allowed to form political parties, and could be
appointed to government posts. This was the earliest
possible outlet for native African politcal aspirations
In 1914 for example, Blaise Diagne became the first
black African to be elected to the French Parliament.
The fact that parliament did not legislate for the
40colonies was ignored. The rest of French Africa wasj 
ruled under less democratic terms, and was actually 
governed by separate laws, among them the legitimacy of 
forced labour.
The Ministry of Colonies only made slight modifica 
tions in detail to the proposals sent by the Governors- 
General. Under the minister was the Conseil Superieur 
des Colonies, to which all colonies could send represen
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tatives, but which in fact was powerless. The delegates 
were white and represented colonial interests.
On the continent itself, the Governor was chosen 
from among senior officials of a special African corp of 
civil servants. He alone could make laws or correspond 
with the minister. Under him came the Secretary General 
and the Government Council of high officials and nomina­
ted leaders who acted in an advisory manner only. Only 
Senegal and Magasascar had assemblies, which also held 
no real power.
Under the Governor-General of French West and 
Equitorial Africa were the governors of the individual 
colonies themselves. (The long resistance to France in 
North Africa prohibited the development of a system 
which could 'delegate power.) Under these lieutenant- 
governors were the district officers or administrators. 
Hard as the French tried to centralise power and 
decision making with the governor-general, the distances 
from the colonial capitals of Dakar and Brazzaville for 
example, to the small village in say Guinea or the coast 
of Gabon, proved too great, thus leaving the maintenance 
of the empire in the hands of district officers and the 
network of village chiefs who were directly under their 
control. It was th*e district officer therefore who was 
responsible for administration, police, taxes, roads, 
buildings, development of the economy and social pro-
gress. The rare visit to the bush by a governor was as 
remarkable as a trip overseas by the minister of colon­
ies .
The British system was little different, although 
it was described as being an Indirect System of Rule.
The cogs in the colonial system were again the district 
officers. The two major differences between the two 
systems were, one, the governor of the individual 
British colony was' equal in power and responsibility to 
the governor-general of the French colonial regions, 
rather than the lieutanant, governors. Despite the 
governor's greater theoretical independence from London, 
he himself ruled only through basic guidelines and 
principles, leaving the actual conduct of the colony in 
the hands of the district officer. The second and more 
significant difference was that the British Indirect 
System of rule, as propounded by its creator, Lord 
Lugard, sought to rule and develop by controlling and 
manipulating existing indigenous institutions, whereas 
the French, like their Belgian and Portugese counter­
parts went out of their way 'to destroy native institut­
ions and appoint whomever they wished into positions of 
authority. In short the British system sought to main­
tain at least the illusion of continuity and tradition, 
while the French did not even bother. Consider the 
words of Gorden Guggisberg, one time governor of the
Gold Coast.
"I have never concealed my conviction that 
it is on the native institutions of this 
country - with the exception of giving 
certain populous municipalities a voice - 
that the gradual development of the consti­
tution must be founded. It was at the 
preservation of native institutions that I 
aimed when devising what is the outstanding 
feature of the new constitution - the 
provincial councils. These councils are 
really the breakwater defending our native
institutions and customs against the disin-
41t e g r a t m g  waves of Western civilisation. "
It is here that the critical difference lies, and 
becomes applicable to the analysis in this paper: that 
is in the intent, or intentions that influenced coloni 
administration. I limit myself to the French and 
British approaches because it was their former colonie 
that charted the course of Pan-Africanism. The Portu­
gese, Belgian, and even the East African holdings of 
France emerged to play their roles later, due to the 
later attainment of independence.
Guggisberg's comments provide an insight into the 
intellectual thinking in Britain surrounding the 
colonial period. Like his French counterpart, the 
common man did not give much thought to the colonial 
empire, and when he did, it was as proud possessor of
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multitudes of exotic lands and peoples, all adding to 
the glory of the empire. The English government, while 
supporting the "civilising mission of colonisation, never 
thought to make her African natives, Englishmen, who had 
bla.ck skin. They wanted them to be civilised, loyal to 
the crown, but never Englishmen. Thus one can have 
governors like Lugard and Guggisberg of Nigeria and the 
Gold Coast, formulating guidelines and policy .that aimed 
at achieving a civilised, western oriented democratic 
system, while remaining African.
The background around French colonialism, saw a 
French empire made of countless diverse peoples, all 
united under a superior French culture. This was the 
grand idea of 'assimilation* which thrived through the • 
first and second republic, when the empire was just 
growing. It lasted until the early part of the 20th 
century, when the rise of the idea of 1 association *', 
where men of different culture were to be left alone,
given good administration and some measure of autonomy,
42 .was debated. While the idea of association was
never applied to Africa, it nevertheless joined the
melting-pot of ideas and opinions on the nature of
France and her citizens. It represented a refusal of
assimilation and a desire to maintain the status quo of
France as the mother country civilising her African
children. One of the effects of such a philosophy would
have far reaching consequences:
"The practical effect of this vague, patrio­
tic and humanitarian idealism were not
negligible on the colonial servants, whose
task is exalted and on the native elites who
4 3tended to think of themselves as French.
The visible effects of the contradiction in French 
colonial policy manifested themselves in numerous ways. 
The educational system lagged behind that of the British 
because of fears of creating an elite. For example in 
the late 1920's there were about 5,000 students atten­
ding Catholic or Protestant mission school in French
West Africa, while in the British colony of the Gold
44Coast alone, there were over 20,000. Inevitably, 
the French were forced to realise that more of the 
indigenous population would have to be trained in 
order to assist in the growing adminstration of the 
colonies, and while the missionery element was the large 
factor in the British colonies, it was the government 
which eventually took charge of the educational system 
in French Africa. It set up schools to train teachers, 
doctors, medical assistants, pharmacists, middle level 
administrators and lawyers. It was to this group, who 
were granted higher education, the so called 'evolues' 
that the theories of a republican France, including 
assimilation began to take a hold.
"Thus it was under the banner of French
Revolutionary ideas which were still alive
among the teaching professionals, that
political movements awakened. The
evolues considered themselves French
Africans and demanded French citizenship.
But French officialdom made no effort to
seize the opportunity; the1 France of a
hundred million inhabitants' was no more.
It was only later that the profound
influence of the colonial period on the
political evolution in French Africa could 
4 5be measured".
One can trace its effect, however, in the growth 
and development of indigenous African political move­
ments, simply by creating the possibilities. As was 
said earlier, all French Africans were theoretically 
French citizens. The Senegalese communities of Dakar, 
Goree, St. Louis and Rufisque actually held this 
citizenship and its rights and priviledges, and this 
implied that all French Black Africans could one day 
achieve the same status. It was to this end that French 
Black Africans devoted their efforts, to achieving the 
rights and priviledges that were being denied to them.
1914 saw Blaise Diagne elected to the French 
Parliament, a position he held until the late 1920's.
He built the Republic Socialist party, from the small 
political associations formed by liberal evolues, like 
Lamine Gueye of Senegal and Ralaimongo of Madagascar,
who were both teachers. Ralaomongo founded the journal 
L 1Opinion, which demanded that Madagascar become a 
department (more closely linked with metropolitan 
France) and that her people be given French citizenship. 
Guye founded the* Socialist Party, which was affiliated 
with the Socialist party in Paris.
Diagne was responsible for the legislation of 
1915-16 which confirmed French citizenship on the black 
natives in the four communes in Senegal, and was 
critical in achieving^the same rights for the rest of 
French Black Africa, in 1946.
.On the French side, the legislation of 1946, was 
influenced in a great-manner by the end of World War II 
and the installation of DeGaulle's Free French adminis­
tration as the legitimate French government. During the 
war, the governor of Chad, Felix Eboue, a black West 
Indian was the first to declare for DeGaulle, and later 
rally the other French governors to DeGaulles' standard 
in 1940. jDeGaulle's Provisional government, feeling the 
need to legitimise its power created a Consulative 
assembly in 1943, in which French Resistance delegates 
sat alongside white delegates from the colonies. The 
Commissaire des Colonies, Rene Pleven, looked into a new 
policy that would take into account the Atlantic Charter,
yet at the same time restore France and the union of its 
46empire. In December of 19 43 he summoned a Mixed
Franco-Malagasy Commission in Tananarive, and later a 
conference in Brazzaville, which was inaugurated by 
DeGaulle himself.
The Brazzaville Conference, has assumed an historic 
place in the history of French Black African political 
development, but for precisely the opposite reasons its 
participants could have imagined. The conference which 
consisted of governors and some members of the Consula- 
tive Assembly, reached many contradictory decisions. 
Among them, the extension of gubenatorial powers, fiscal 
decentralization, consolidation of the powers possessed 
by chiefs,, special status for evolues, and the employ­
ment of Africans in the administration. Politically 
France was to remain indivisible.
"The aims of France's civilising mission in 
her colonies preclude any thought of 
autonomy or any possibility of development 
outside the French empire. Self government 
must be rejected - even in the more distant 
future."  ^^
Inspite of this, the conference endorsed the 
creation of general councils composed of Europeans and 
Africans from each colony. In addition, the colonies 
were to progress from administrative decentralization to 
political personality. The conference went on to 
suggest that the colonies be represented in the future 
Constituent Assembly which would be held in Paris
48eventually in 1945.
On the part of the Africans, Diagne's path was 
followed by many whose names would later become famous; 
Houphouet-Boigny, Modibo Keita, Leopold Senghor, Sekou 
Toure, Dior Hamani, all of whom were also deputies, 
elected to the French Parliament> and participated in 
the Constituent Assembly of 1945, which laid down the 
preliminary groundwork for eventual French citizenship 
for all of Black French Africa. The African minority, 
though small, grew. That particular assembly had 23 
African deputies, three of whom were eleced by white 
colleges. In the parliamentary assembly, the Conseil de 
la Republique and the Assembly of the African Union, 
there were 114 Africans altogether. They mnanaged to, 
create an intra colonial party the Rassamblement 
Democratique Africain (RDA) headed by Houphouet,
Senghor, Keita, Sekou Toure and Hamani. An interesting 
point is that while their numbers were few, they held as 
much power as. metropolitan deputies; they represented 
the whole of France and thus exerted influence on the 
rise and fall of ministers. Each French government 
after 1946 had at least one African minister or 
secretary of state up until the 1960's.
French black African political parties and 
movements thus evolved under radically different 
conditions from those of their British counterparts.
They fought for rights which were theirs as citizens of 
France, while the British colonies, always subjects but 
never citizens of Britain, were determined to achieve 
self government and later independence.
French North Africa resembled the British situation 
more closely than it did the French. Morrocco, for 
example, strongly resisted the French until 1934.
Though late in the development of political parties, 
they never lost their determination to achieve indepen­
dence once again.
Tunisia's first political party, the Young 
Tunisians formed in 1907,.was initially infavour of 
French administration, and only agitated for France to 
fulfill her development projects. It was only after the 
founder of the Destour Party, a few years later and the 
idea of creating a new Tunisia, based on traditional 
legal and political systems, while rejecting those of 
France, that Tunisia's true political path began to 
appear. It was the Neo-Destour Party which led Tunisia 
to independence.
Algeria's indigenous political movements began to 
reassert themselves in 1912, when young, French educated 
Muslims founded the party of Young Algerians which 
demanded the law of Nature be abolished. In 1926, the 
more radical Etoile-Nort-Africane was founded by Ali Abd 
al Quadir. The party espoused socialism, and the
unification of the Maghreb (Egypt, Algeria, Morrocco and 
Tunisia). Later, in 1929 under Messali Hadj, the party 
became more nationally oriented. This was one of the 
few organisations at that time to be openly against the 
French. the majority of the parties, for example the 
Federation des Elus Musulman, founded by Ferhat Abbas, 
favoured assimilation and equality between Frenchmen and 
Muslims. The different political perspectives followed 
classlines, the older highly educated Algerians 
favouring assimilation while the younger generation of 
nationalists, who were not so well educated wanted an 
independent Muslim Algeria. Eventually the younger 
generation won out and by 19 34 was already waging a 
bitter civil was with France that would last for nearly 
eighteen years.
The British Situation
The response to British colonialism, like the 
French,, Africans in North Africa, went from strong 
support of the colonial mission of civilising Africa to 
polite requests and later strident demands for indepen­
dence. The main difference lay in the effect of the 
large and relatively widespread system of education 
which the British built and which produced a larger more 
capable and ambitious elite class, then was the case in 
French West Africa.
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The 1920's saw the colonies of West Africa first 
begin to feel the economic * competition and discrimina­
tion of British rule as the percentage of Africans in
the government increased slightly while that of the
49British nationals doubled. There was also increased 
discrimination in the church, as there too, natives 
began to suffer blocks and impediments in their rise in 
the church hierarchy thus provoking African mini-sters to 
break away from the English church. Inspite of this, 
the first political organisation of any significance, 
the National Congress of British West Africa, founded by 
Herbert Macaule was more influenced by the outbreak of 
World War I and its desire to champion the British 
cause, then by any desire for more autonomy. Its stated 
aim was to 'aid in the development of political institu­
tions in British West Africa under the Union Jack'.
t
They too wished to become a dominion of the imperial 
50country. By the end of the 1920's the Congress was 
already suffering attacks both externally and 
internally. While they wanted increased representation 
on the British colonial councils, they also wanted a 
federal union of self governing territories. The 
contradictions rendered the Congress impotent.
The next wave of nationalists, I.T.D. Wallace-John- 
son of Sierra Leone, J. B. Danquah of the Gold Coast, 
and N. Azikiwe, were all a little less patient in the
manner and the language, although not really radical in 
the scope of their demands. They started organisations 
which soon began to raise more of a fuss for the British 
authorities. In 1938, the Nigerian Youth Movement 
issued a charter calling for the complete handover of 
government into native hands.
The final wave of British African nationalists 
emerged after World War II. In the Gold Coast, Danquah 
founded the United Gold Coast Convention, which began to 
agitate for British concessions and eventual self 
government. In 19 47, the UGCC invited Kwame Nkrumah to 
be its Secretary, they thus unknowingly cast the control 
of the independence movement into the hands of the radi­
cals, who demanded independence immediately.
In Nigeria, the final nationalist wave was fractured 
by the division of the colony into three regions which 
each held a tribal majority. In the North, the Northern 
Elements Progressive Union founded by Aminu Kanu, fought 
for control with the Northern Peoples Congress, founded 
by the reigning Emirs of the Muslim caliphates which 
were still politically powerful.
In the south, Azikiwe formed the National Council 
of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the Eastern region in 
19 44, while in the West, a Yoruba lawyer, Obafemi 
Awolowo, founded the Action Group in 19 50.
Sierra Leone, which had evolved with almost two
seperate colonies, within the same boundaries; the first 
the Westernized creoles and the second the indigenous 
natives who lived an almost perfectly insulated tribal 
existence, went two constitutions in 1947 and 1951. 
Finally the Creole led but Protectorate (interior) based 
Sierra Leone Peoples Party, under Sir Milton Margai, 
managed to create a coalition, and put effective 
pressure on the British authorities in 1953. Their 
demands were for independence.
In the Gambia, the political movements rose up 
around the capital, and from them came the Peoples 
Progressive Party under Dawda Jawara, which achieved 
internal self-government in 1963.
East Africa's transition from colonies to indepen­
dent countries was complicated by the presence of white 
settlers, and the radically different manner in which 
the colonies were administred.
These factors led to the delays in achieveing 
independence, and therefore reduced their influence and 
participation in the founding of the OAU. Kenya, for 
instance became independent in 1963, and Tanzania and 
Zambia became independent in 1964. They have therefore 
been left out of this review of the colonial backgrounds 
which shaped the majority of Africa's political elite.
This chapter has concentrated on the social and 
cultural influence that the colonial perios had on
British and French Africa. Colonisation represents the 
most critical factor affecting the development of the 
perception and perspective of African leadership. Its 
direct results can be seen in the speeches and writings 
which will be examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Results of the Colonial Experience On African 
Leadership
The line connecting foreign policy and nationalism 
can always be fairly well discerned. It is a progres­
sion: ones foreign policy is based on ones national 
interests, and conducted accordingly. In the particular 
case of the African states, the link between their 
colonial-past and the nationalism which they espoused 
upon achieveing independence, and their foreign policy 
are their leaders. These were the men who led the 
independence movements and invariably came to power, and 
controlled most aspects of governmental decision making. 
The connection therefore becomes all the more direct and 
yet more complicated, because it raises the individual 
factor, which is so susceptible to many other influences, 
to the center of our attention. These other forces can 
not be denied, and must be acknowledged in the shaping 
of personal philosophies and decisions. Nevertheless, 
the individual dan be placed within his context, which 
includes the historical background, the interaction of 
culture and outside forces which met up within the 
individual. The historical background, was the colonial 
period.
In the case of French Africa, its effect on
political leadership was profound:
"The formation of a small Frenchified elite,
even though it could not boast an education
above the level of secondary schools,
provided cadres for the political parties
and afterwards for the republics. Their
leaders were mindful of the inferior status
which had made them wish for emancipation,
but at the same time for identification with
the French intellectual elite. This fact
along with the established relations with
the French and a long attachment with the
metropolitan economy, partially explains the
duration of the 'Union Francais1 and the
maintenance of close relations with France
51after independence".
Consider this correspondence from Blaise 
Diagne to Marcus Garvey,
"We French nations wish to remain French,
since France has given us every liberty and
since she has unreservedly accepted us upon
the same basis as her own European children.
None of us aspires to see French Africa
delivered exclusively to the Africans as is
demanded, though without any authority, by
the Ameircan negroes, at the head of whom
you have placed yourself. No propaganda, no
influence of the blacks, or of the whites
will take from us the pure sentiment that
France alone is capable of working
generously for the advancement of the black 
,,52race .
This was the initial French reaction to the growing 
swell of Pan-Africanist sentiment. Diagne's pro-French 
sentiment, eventually alienated him from his own people, 
nevertheless, the attachment to France would continue 
and is clear in the speeches of Houphoet-Boigny, of the 
Ivory Cost, who was the leading spokeman for the 
conservative Pan-Africanist philosophy. On France, he 
said,
"We would be unfair if we wanted to deny the 
works accomplished by France in Africa.
Internal slave trade was making the people 
suffer. The coming of France was looked 
forward to with great hope. France came in 
the name of Liberty".
On the subject of independence, he spoke ardently 
against the idea of absolute independence. He viewed 
the world as becoming more and more organised into 
larger political and economic units, but for him, that 
larger unit of which the Ivory Coast was to belong to 
would be a French one.
"On the morrow of the last war, France 
conceived a beautiful and grand design; to 
free and emancipate her former colonies 
scattered over the five continents of the 
world and to associate them with her 
destiny... She undertook, by the very act of 
setting up the French Union, to lead the 
peoples for whom she was responsible towards
freedom to administer their own affairs 
democratically... France renounced 
dominance... believing that that which 
endures is based on equality and 
brotherhood. She wants to create a new 
community based on friendship and 
confidence.
We were warned. Our response was the 
conscientious and responsible men of French 
Black Africa, those who have fought 
colonisation the hardest and are still 
fighting colonialism in all its forms, want, 
while remaining vigilant to do away with the 
paralyzing distrust, to rise above all 
feelings of bitterness, even the most 
legitimate and grasp the brotherly hand that 
is held out to them.
In West Africa and Equatorial Africa, 
over 60 million Africans... were divided, by 
the accident of colonisation in the last 
century into two groups of different cul­
tures: English and French.
The first group, English speaking is 
moving towards independence within the 
framework of the commonwealth, with ties 
that are more economic than political.
The second is moving toward self-
government within a federal community which
remains to be defined judicially, but whose
ties within the community are of sentimental,
53economic and political in nature."
Leopold Senghor, the other pivotal leader of French 
West Africa echoed similar sentiments, although there
was the difference of Senghor’s philosophy of 
'Negritude'. His attempt to form the Mali Federation 
out of the former French colonies of West Africa, placed 
him slightly farther away from Paris and from Houphouet. 
Senghor wished for a community which would have a strong 
African identity. "We must have an African community, 
before we, can have a Franco-African Community".
Senghor's 'Negritude' was developed as a rejection of 
the 'assimilationistr assumption that African culture 
was essentially inferior to French culture. The 
differences between Senghor and Houphouet were, 
therefore, slight, in theory but they did have 
repurcussions, in the political activities which the two 
took part in. Senghor was thus the middle ground 
between Houphouet and their more radical comrade, Sekou 
Toure of Guinea, for example.
"And yet in the interest of Black 
Africa and of France, our aim must be to 
unite, within the Mali federation, all the
i 1
old states of the old A.O.F. and to sign in 
the meantime, economic and cultural pacts 
with the other states, including the 
republic of Guinea. By doing so, we shall 
only be following France's example."
Perhaps the most interesting point is the constant 
concern over the well being of France.
"The reconstruction of the old federa­
tion is finally in the interest of the 
French Community. As I have often 
said: the association of the 
earthenware pot and the iron pot is 
contrary to nature. Based on unequal 
strength, it causes trouble, engenders 
weakness. However, the strength of 
each of the partners is moral as well 
as material, poltical as well as 
economic. The French community will be 
solid only to the extent that the 
States - I mean their populations - 
feel that they are morally equal 
partners and have a real share in the 
decisions of the Executive council.
How could this be achieved if they came 
disunited, while metropolitan ministers 
of the community always formed a 
cohesive bloc? How could this be 
achieved if they get the discouraging 
impression that their progress depends 
not on their united organisational
effort, but rather on the pleasure of
54metropolitan France?"
The warm friendly relations between France and her 
former colonies had one exception, Guinea, and Sekou 
Toure's solitary vote against the 'Loi Cadre1. 
DeGaulle's great referendum, where one chose either to 
be a part of France or against her, culminated the 
development of one of Africa's truly revolutionary 
socialist leaders. Like his elder comrades, Houphouet
and Senghor, Toure was a former French deputy, elected 
to the French Parliament and also a founding member of 
the RDA. His rise to political leadership, was through 
the trade unions, of French West Africa whom he repre­
sented at a conference in Paris, where he was introduced 
to the far left of French politics. Alongside his 
strong committment to trade unions, was his committment 
to Africaness, which made him hostile to pressure from 
the metropolitan affiliations which the French African 
trade unions were subject to. In 1957 he became presi­
dent of the first independent black trade union the 
UGTAN, which planned to "unite and organize the workers 
of black Africa, to coordinate their trade union 
activities in the struggle against the colonial regime 
and other forms of exploitation."
Sekou Toure1s break with Paris started in 1957 when 
the RDA was split between supporters of a federal 
community linked to France, led by Sekou Toure and 
Senghor and supporters of individual sovreignity with 
each territory linked to France separately and directly, 
held by Houphouet Boigny. When the issue was shunted 
aside, and France later offered autonomy within the 
French Community or complete independence, Sekou Toure 
voted for independence and subsequent relations sank to 
an extremely low point. Prior to this, Sekou Toure was 
a confirmed radical, an Africanist, but as the leader of
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an independent Guinea, he became the leading proponent 
of Pan-Africanism, after Nkrumah.
"Thus the independent states of Africa 
were totally justified in the excercise of 
their sovreignty, to concentrate their 
interests on the prospects of a free and 
united Africa. They will not under any 
pretext ignore the fundemental problem: that 
of the national independence of colonized 
peoples "who are trying to elude the colonial 
powers by more or less fortunate and just 
transformation of the,legal ties which those 
powers have imposed upon their victims...
The determination of Guinea to see the 
realization of unity in the independence of 
Africa, is notably, as regards the means of 
development, the determination to see Africa 
itself participate in the development of its 
own wealth in the primordial interests of 
its populations...Having affirmed during the 
referendum organized by France that Guinea 
prefers liberty in poverty to opulence in 
slavery, we consider it another duty to 
declare before the representatives of the 
United Nations that, in the perspectives of 
a swift and democratic evolution of Africa, 
we, the national leaders of the republic of 
Guinea, would prefer to be the last in a 
united Africa, rather than the first in a 
divided Africa.
France’s colonies to the north were also split in 
their relationships with France after independence due 
to their colonial experience. In Algeria, Ferhat Abbas,
who was to be its first president had once said on the 
eve of the Algerian war, "We prefer to be ten million 
corpses, rather than ten million slaves." He was 
replaced by Youssef Ben Khedda, who had been a key 
organiser in the independence movement even before it 
left the suburbs of the capital, and was a radical 
nationalist, anti-French. When he came to power in 
1961, the government communique reflected its socialist 
outlook, and its neutralist stance, in international 
affairs. The same middle ground that the radical 
Pan-Africanists, who had supported their cause against 
the French, were saying a united Africa would become.
The difference in the political outlook of the Algerians 
on one hand and Motrocco and Tunisia on the other, was 
due to a number of reasons aside from the civil war 
which left the Algerians and the French bitter with each 
other, but at the bottom of everyone of them was the 
colonial relationship which aggravated Franco-Algerian 
relations.
"Throughout this period, but especially in 
the critical early 1950's, Cairo provided a 
sympathetic base for the nationalist of the 
Maghreb, and also gave them a little 
material support. These faced the 
Paris-settler in its full rigor. But the 
duality worked in Tunisia and Morrocco 
differently from in Algeria. Partly, this 
was by reason of the variable between 
settler-population sizes: around 1945 there
were about 250,000 Europeans in Tunisia,
perhaps 300,000 in Morrocco but much more
than a million in Algeria. Partly the
variable derived from the fact that Tunisia
and Morrocco were recognised as
protectorates, with some evential claim to a
life of their osn, while Algeria north of
the Sahara had long been governed as an
integral segment of France, and so, in
practice entirely in the interests of local 
..56Europeans.
Tunisia's growing demands for independence were met 
by a France that was already losing a war and clashing 
with an increasingly violent radical movement in Algeria 
and Morrocco. When the first signs of similarity began 
to appear in Tunisia, in 1954, when 70,000 French troops 
were tied down fighting in the countryside, the French 
began to ,try other methods. Destour Party leader Habib 
Bourgiba was freed from jail and allowed to regain his 
influence and control thus preventing the party from 
going into a hard line anti-French mentality. When 
Tunisia was granted independence, it was Bourgiba who 
came to power, and while there were no thoughts of 
compromising on independence, his relationship with 
France was far from hostile.
Morroccan foreign policy as an extension of her 
colonial experience, stands inbetween Algeria and 
Tunisia. Like Egypt, Morrocco1s royal family had ruled
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with the permission of Paris since 1912. In 1927, 
Mohammed V mounted the throne, the French believeing him 
to be 'manageable'. But the regency ended three years 
later, as the young sultan proved himself very able, 
intelligent and profoundly attached to Islam, although 
open to new ideas. Mohammed V came to symbolise Morroc- 
can nationalism, submitting unwillingly to Vichy rule, 
but welcoming the American forces. The Independence 
Party, Istiqual, first demanded complete independence. 
Mohammed V soon came to support their cause openly and 
was exiled in 1953. Public outrage however, and the 
deterioration of th'e rest of French north Africa, forced 
Paris to negotiate with the Sultan, and he returned in 
1955 and in 1960, took direct control of the government. 
His committment and position, on African unity, were 
reflected in his hosting of the famous Casablanca con­
ference, at which the radical Casablanca group solidi­
fied .
As one moved farther east, there was Nasser's Egypt 
which had become independent in 1952, when a military 
coup toppled King Farouk. While Egypt had been indepen­
dent on paper since 1942, the country had remained as 
much a subject of Britain as it had ever been. Added to 
this were the undeniable facts that the government and 
court of Farouk were as corrupt as they were seemingly 
indifference to the economic chaos and loss of national
dignity. All this combined to make the coup a wave of
purifying nationlism. Nasser's radical Pan-African
stance solidified with the Suez Canal crisis, and the
realization that European economic interests still
threatened to try and circumscribe the newly won
independence1 of Africa and Egypt. At the same time,
Nasser's efforts at promoting pan-Arab unity fell
through in 1961 with the attempted union with Syria, and
then later that same year with Yemen. The arena left to
him lay on the African continent.
The last of the African Heads of State to make the
issue of African Unity a prominent one in their foreign
policy was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. His committment and
perspective on African Unity has already been well
documented, by the mere retelling of Pan-African
history, of which he is an integral part. His numerous
books and speeches on African Unity, all elaborate on
his ideas, and were presented in a nutshell in a speech
he made in 1960.
"Fellow Africans, you all know that foreign 
domination in Africa effectively disintegra­
ted the personality of the African people.
For centuries during which colonialism held 
sway over our beloved continent, colonialism 
imposed on the mind of Africans the idea 
that their own kith and kin in other parts 
of Africa were aliens and had little, if 
anything in common with Africans elsewhere.
It was in the interest of the colonial and
settler rulers to perpetuate the subjection 
of use, the indigenous people, by pursuing a 
policy not only of 'divide-and rule', but 
also of artificial territorial division of 
Africa. It played upon our tribalistic 
instincts. It sowed seeds of dissension in 
order to promote disunity among us.
It is therefore with great pride and 
happiness that we note how resurgent Africa 
is witnessing today what is by no means a 
humble beginning of a process of re-integra­
tion of the African personality and the 
forging of closer and stronger bonds of
unity which are bound to bring us to our
ultimate goal: the attainment of a Union of 
African States and Republics which, to my
mind is the only solution to the problems
5 7facing Africa today."
The fact that only Nkrumah emerges as a radical 
from British West Africa, could be seen as a negation of 
the thesis of this paper, but a concluding analysis, 
will put his radicalism, and the lack of it in the other 
leaders of British West Africa, into their proper 
perspective, and give hopefully the whole picture.
Finally there was Emperor Haile Selassie of 
Ethiopia, who played a most crucial yet enigmatic role
in the formation of the OAU. There is no question that
it was due to his prestige and position as the leader of 
Africa's oldest independent nation that his voice 
carried great weight with all of Africa's other heads of
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state. Nor can one ignore the diplomacy with which he 
managed to bring together the different factions at one 
conference. Perhaps it was precisely because of the 
fact that he had to remain accessible to all sides that 
prevented him from taking a clear stance on African 
Unity. An example of this ambiguity is demonstrated in 
his opening address to the Summit where he stated that 
eventual African Unity was unquestionable while in the 
same speech advocated a gradual journey towards that 
goal with no specific timetable.
In the case of the Emperor, one must remember that 
he alone of Africa's leaders had experienced the loss of 
authority in his country and had been exiled from 193 6 
to 1941. At the same time the nature of the Ethiopian 
government was still as' rigidly traditional as it was 
autocratic. However strong the Emperor’s commitment to 
African Unity, it was no doubt tempered by an under­
standing of the dynamics of power and authority. Haile 
Selassie then, s,tood at a pivotal role in what was to be 
the final step towards African Unity. But, one will 
never know just how much further the Emperor would have 
gone.
CONCLUSION
Colonialism has been used as an explanation for 
numerous events, perspectives and actions of the African 
Heads of States. Its effects on their nations, the 
development of their political processes, have been 
analysed countless times. At the same, time, the 
nationalist movements of Africa can not be analysed 
without reference t o ,Pan-Africanism. Modern African 
nationalism evolved out of Pan-Africanism, and its 
theories, are a founding pillar on which it was built.
It was also Pan-Africanism that managed to bridge 
twentieth century intellectual thought and organisation 
with the indigenous aspirations of once again regaining 
liberty. It did this by providing leadership; men 
capable and determined to win independence for the 
people.
The anaylsis therefore tends to overlap at certain 
points, colonialism and the development of nationliasm 
on the one hand, and Nationalism and Pan-Africanism on 
the other.. The purpose of this paper has been to look 
at one aspect of that overlap, foreign policy 
specifically concerning African Unity, and trace the 
line of connection. The connection is that the colonial 
experience, has been a major factor in deciding whether
a country was radically supportive of African Unity or 
whether it was conservative.
Colonialism's single uniting factor, that is the 
fact that all these countries had a colonial history, is 
negated by the great difference in the effects that 
colonisation had on the different colonies. This was 
due to the differences in the colonizing countries 
themselves. However, a basic and primary factor of 
colonisation was the diffusion of the colonizing 
country. Albert Memi wrote on the grand task of 
'civilising' Africa: "This was the justification for
the conquest and exploitation of colonialism, and 
despite governmental concentration on the aquisitprial 
side of colonialism, the diffusion of cultures and 
values took place, and its clearest manifestation is in 
the political leadership that led Africa to 
independence."
The connection in the case of the French colonies 
is quite clear. The critical factor was not the actual 
colonial process but the diffusion of the ideas of 
Republican France, its desire for an empire of 'a 
hundred million' diverse in background, but all 
nevertheless French. Thus members of her colonies were 
made French citizens on paper, though not in practice. 
When the nationalist movements began to agitate, unlike 
their British African counterparts, they were not
fighting for independence, but for rights which were 
theirs but were being denied to them. The case is 
similar to the Civil Rights Movement here in the United 
States. The compromises made by Paris were therefore 
undeniable as they were legally correct.
Thus, the last fifteen years of French rule in 
Africa had black Africans representing their colonies in 
the French parliament and different administrations. 
French Africa's political elite-were thus left with the 
job of fighting for increased representation rather than 
fighting for actual independence. And when independence 
came, the intimacy of the relationship with Paris, was 
unchanged.
There were only three exceptions to this rule, 
Algeria, Guinea and Morrocco, who for reasons already 
elaborated on came to independence with cooler and less 
favorable relations and impressions of France. Their 
other similarity was than they were also all radical 
Pan-African states.
The British case seems a little less clear, while 
all of British Africa was united on the issue of achie­
ving total independence, only Nkrumah of Ghana emerged 
as a proponent of radical Pan-Africanism. The connec­
tion therefore appears to be broken, but in fact it is 
not.
Sierra Leone and Nigeria came to independence as
unstable amalgamations of different tribal groupings.
The uneasy alliance between the Western-educated coastal 
tribes and the creoles of the hinterland in Sierra Leone 
mirrored the deep mistrust between the three regions of 
Nigeria. At the same time it was’ the NP C , controlled by 
the Sarduana of Sokoto, and Premier Tafewa Balewa, who 
came to power, not Azikiwe, who had worked alongside 
Nkrumah, at the Manchester Pan-African Congress in 1945. 
In both countries, the concentration was therefore 
internal, the politics of nationlism superceded the 
politics of foreign policy. Especially any ideas would 
reduce their already tenuous control of their countries. 
In the case of the Gambia, which is the smallest country 
in West Africa, there must have been aprehension at the 
fate of Togolese President Olympius Sylvaiuus, who was 
overthrown, by a coup, which was rumoured to be 
supported by Nkrumah, with whom he had clashed.
The ambitiousness of Nkrumah's vision was matched 
only by his intolerance of|imperialism, !and the 
'stooges' of imperialism. This attitude alienated many 
of the leaders of West Africa from him, both French and 
English, who were wary of a self appointed leader.
In the final analysis, it was the concentration of 
radicalism in one man, and the inheritance of tribal 
divisions from the colonial period which resulted in the 
patchy appearance of radicalism in British West Africa. 
On the French side it was the lack of republican egali­
tarianism, in the colonies of Guinea, Algeria and 
Morrocco which fostered that same radicalism.
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